Landmark Achievements

Welcome to Whitenoise,

On this web site you will see references to scientific or landmark achievements in cryptography.

This paper points to landmark achievements in the order they were discovered and verified as simply as possible. They are facts that you should have reviewed by your best scientists, technicians and cryptographers. They are facts that good scientific method says should be continually challenged, tested and verified. We will gently point to cross motives you can easily unravel with proper research and questioning. All scientific and business environments unfortunately come with competing interests that color the messaging of others.

Understanding truths is more important than ever now in 2013, as it is generally accepted that government agencies in many countries can break any existing cryptographic algorithm. They are not only doing this with traditional cryptanalytic techniques and mathematical short cuts but also with the ability to steal keys clandestinely. Unfortunately they are now able to break any encrypted data (cipher text) without keys, just using the sheer computational power and speeds available in today's computers and brute force on the data you wrongly believe to be secure. Previously relied upon encryption algorithms simply do not produce random enough encrypted data.

We are faced with the stark reality that unless Whitenoise and DIVA are deployed that there is not a single secure public network on earth.


Performance analysis: This performance analysis was paid for by the National Research Council of Canada and conducted at the renowned laboratories at the University of Victoria .

This was the first time that a cryptographic algorithm passed the NIST randomness tests on the first round, without running data through the encryption process at least a second time (this is much like putting meat through a meat grinder a second time.)

This was the first time that a cryptographic algorithm did not even have anticipated statistical errors in randomness testing during months of testing against a super computer array. The NIST test suite is the benchmark used for this kind of study and analysis. It allows for one statistical failure for every hundred rounds of testing on a cryptographic algorithm. For the purposes of this study, this threshold was increased by an order of magnitude and was set up to allow only one statistical failure for every thousand rounds of testing. There was not a single statistical failure. This created a scientific conundrum in a field that only allows theorizing about pseudo randomness. This research showed that WHITENOISE IS ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE MORE RANDOM THAN RADIO-ACTIVE DECAY , which has historically been accepted as the benchmark for the most random event in nature.



Security Analysis

This security analysis was done by David Wagner, a renowned cryptographer at the University of California , Berkeley . Dr. Wagner is internationally recognized and has been used for expert testimony on cryptography and security by United States Congressional committees. He is also internationally recognized for working on the Blowfish algorithm and morphing it into the Two Fish algorithm after the failure of Blow Fish to be approved as the second AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) competition winner. Dr. Wagner was recommended by Brian O'Higgins, a true Canadian and cryptographic icon, and attention was focused on the results of this study by the National Research Council of Canada and Communications Security Establishment.

A security analysis examines whether there are any known mathematical or brute force techniques that can be used to break an encryption algorithm.

The scope documents for proper Whitenoise deployment state that Whitenoise subkeys should never be smaller than hundreds of bytes long and that in commercial, military and government market deployments, it is not recommended to use Whitenoise keys that are weaker than 250,000 bits in strength or shorter than 10 to the 14 power bytes in length.

The laboratories at the University of California , Berkeley chose to try to break the smallest and weakest Whitenoise key that can be constructed. Having used subkeys of the smallest prime number lengths (i.e. 2, 3, 5, 7, 11 etc. bytes long) and the weakest bit strength possible, 1600 bits, Dr. Wagner was still compelled to concede and report:

"Exhaustive keysearch is not a threat. With the recommended parameters, Whitenoise uses keys with at least 1600 bits of randomness. Exhaustive search of 1600-bit keys is completely and absolutely infeasible. Even if we hypothesized the existence of some magic computer that could test a TRILLION-TRILLION key trials per second (very unlikely!), and even if we could place a TRILLION-TRILLION such computers somewhere throughout the universe (even more unlikely!), and even if we were willing to wait a TRILLION-TRILLION years (not a chance!), then the probability that we would discover the correct key would be negligible (about 1/2 to the 1340 power), which is unimaginably small. Hence, if keys are chosen appropriately and Whitenoise is implemented correctly, EXHAUTIVE KEYSEARCH IS NOT A THREAT ."

David Wagner UC Berkeley


Side Channel attack resistance


To date there has been no known implementation of cryptography that has been side channel attack resistant.

University of Victoria (BC) study on side channel attack resistant chips

Side Channel Attack Resistant Implementations in microprocessors and restrive electronic components

Three Reasons Why Side Channel Attacks Don't Work Against Whitenoise and Patent Number



Whitenoise stands up to public scrutiny and testing.

In 2008 Whitenoise Laboratories Canada conducted a very public challenge called the $100,000 Whitenoise Challenge . Just a little bit of reading will show that this was conducted with the knowledge and scrutiny of every internationally acclaimed cryptographer and algorithm creator, representatives from all levels of academia, and military and government personnel tasked with our security, including members of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. No one broke a Whitenoise key.

In 2013, currently running for 1 year, we are sponsoring The Challenge That Black Hat Would Not Take but DEFCON did! While we appreciate the results of the University of Victoria landmark study acknowledging that there are no known side channel attack classes that can break a Whitenoise key, we have invited the UVIC researcher to use the theoretical postulation that he flatly states should not be used. He was asked to demonstrate his theory in order to collect the rather large prize.


There was no winner.





We believe everyone should have security and privacy at a reasonable cost.