This is simple for any qualified chip lab to verify. Scope and design documents as well as the original FPGA from this research is available. The two contexts examined were the efficiency of Whitenoise deployed from FPGAs and its security against a very small restricted class of side channel attacks.
These kinds attacks are expensive and the attacker never has access to the device and its chip to conduct it in the first place. The lead researcher and Whitenoise designed additional security techniques for any theoretical attack. University of Victoria, British Columbia Side Channel Attack Research
What is a side channel attack? The following link shows a simple and understandable analogy for how side channel attacks work. At its core, side channel attacks exploit physical characteristics that become introduced into an implementation context for which a solution is being sought and an algorithm is being used. It can only tell us something about whether that particular implementation was successful or not. An unsuccessful implementation does not presuppose any flaws in the algorithm. A Side Channel Attack analogy for learning
In order to properly evaluate Side Channel Attack research we must first understand the difference between analyzing the security of algorithms and analyzing the implementation of an algorithm in order to try to solve a security problem that is context specific.
Next we look at an analysis of a Side Channel Attack research study at the University of Victoria, British Columbia and what it actually says and mistakes that invalidate this study and its claims as stated. It is necessary to point out to those who simply read Google descriptions without careful review of actual materials that Mr. Babak Zakeri and the University of Victoria, British Columbia actually concluded:
"“The proposal and its improvement can merely be seen as a theoretical proof that the implementation is vulnerable..."
Two years of research provided no demonstration and no mathematics or data to support the claim.
This is the link to the original study so that you can compare the words and see that the claim that was made was unproven and misleading.
This is a link to visual comparisons to the patented data source process versus an approach utilizing circular shift registers.
Finally, we will examine a paper that examines the advancement that actually resulted inadvertently from the study. While the original research certainly doesn't support any break claim it shows that Whitenoise is the only algorithm that can be used to secure circular shift registers, counters, and registers which are notoriously weak links in our critical infrastructures that are vulnerable to side channel attacks. That is a significant advancement and a benefit to all.
Whitenoise can secure counters, registers and circular shift registers
The above paper will be linked when it is formally posted with a standards group over the next few weeks. Please bookmark this page and return.